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Abstract
Most past work on social network link fraud detection tries to separate genuine users from fraudsters,
implicitly assuming that there is only one type of fraudulent behavior. But is this assumption true?
And, in either case, what are the characteristics of such fraudulent behaviors? In this work, we set up
honeypots, (“dummy” social network accounts), and buy fake followers (after careful IRB approval). We
report the signs of such behaviors including oddities in local network connectivity, account attributes, and
similarities and differences across fraud providers. Most valuably, we discover and characterize several
types of fraud behaviors. We discuss how to leverage our insights in practice by engineering strongly
performing entropy-based features and demonstrating high classification accuracy. Our contributions are
(a) instrumentation: we detail our experimental setup and carefully engineered data collection process
to scrape Twitter data while respecting API rate-limits, (b) observations on fraud multimodality: we
analyze our honeypot fraudster ecosystem and give surprising insights into the multifaceted behaviors of
these fraudster types, and (c) features: we propose novel features that give strong (>0.95 precision/recall)
discriminative power on ground-truth Twitter data.
1 Introduction
What are the characteristics of fraudulent accounts in online social networks? Understanding the behavior
and actions of fraudsters is paramount to building effective anti-fraud algorithms. While previous works
in social network fraud detection have primarily focused on leveraging signature properties of fraudsters
including temporally synchronized behavior [3], excessively dense [16] and oddly distributed [17] graph
connectivity, uncommon account names [6] and spammy links [8], our work focuses on establishing the
veracity and applicability of these assumptions. In doing so, we ask: do all fraudsters share the same
signature behavior, or are there multiple signatures? Since fraud detection is an adversarial setting in which
fraudsters are constantly adapting to in-place detection mechanisms, it is important to constantly monitor
and evaluate the strategies that fraudsters are employing to profitably perform ingenuine actions to better
inform future detection mechanisms.
We focus on one particular setting of social network fraud called link fraud which involves the use of
fake, sockpuppet accounts to create links, or graph connections, which represent followership or support of
target, customer entities. Fake links artificially inflate the follower count of customer accounts, making them
appear more popular than they actually are. These fake links are deceptive to authentic users and hinder the
performance of machine learning algorithms which rely on authentic user input to recommend relevant and
useful content to their userbase.
To study the behavior of these fake follower accounts, we employ the use of honeypots, or dummy ac-
counts on which we solicit fake Twitter followers sourced from various fraud service providers. Honeypots
enable us to have an clear signal of fake follower activity which is not tainted by follows from real accounts.
Upon setting up the honeypot accounts and purchasing fake followers, we instrument a number of carefully
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Figure 1: Freemium (Fre) and premium (Pre) fraud types have different local network structure and
account attributes compared to genuine behavior. Nodes are colored by modularity class, and sized
proportional to in-degree in (a)-(c). The associated, reordered adjacency matrices are shown in (e)-(g) – the
vertical line in each spyplot indicates the the central node. Notice the block community structure in genuine
followers compared to the star structure for premium and near-clique structure for freemium followers. (d)
shows differences in attribute (language and follower) entropy over the various behaviors, showing how
fraud patterns skew attribute distributions away from genuine ones.
engineered tracking scripts which poll Twitter API to store details including account relationships and at-
tributes over a period of time. This allows us to collect a rich representation of the fraudster ecosystem
which we subsequently analyze.
In this work, we make and explore the following key observation:
Key Insight (Fraud Multimodality). There are multiple types of link fraud which exhibit notably different
network structures and patterns in account attribute settings.
Specifically, we focus on studying and characterizing the network connectivity properties and attribute
distributions which are exhibited by fake followers involved in these different types of fraud. We detail a
number of further observations on how these types of behavior induce different, odd network structures and
suspicious patterns in account attributes. Figure 1 shows the contrast in follower connectivity of a genuine
account versus two distinct types of fraudsters. Through our analysis, we additionally engineer strong
features which enable us to discriminate these fraudulent users from genuine ones using novel (first-order)
follower entropy features.
Summarily, our work offers the following notable contributions:
• Instrumentation: We detail our experimental setup and data scraping tools which gather a wealth of
Twitter user information while respecting API rate limits.
• Observations on Fraud Multimodality: We discover that link fraud is not unimodal and instead
has multiple types, and identify and characterize two such types: freemium and premium, with the
possibility of more.
• Features: Based on the above observations, we carefully engineer novel, entropy-based features
which allow us to accurately discern fraudsters from genuine users in our ground-truth Twitter dataset
with near-perfect F1-score.
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2 Related Work
We categorize related work into two categories: underground market studies and fraud detection approaches.
Underground Markets: Prior works have shown the use of fake accounts for followers in social media
[21], phone-verified email accounts [20], Facebook likes [3], etc. These accounts are often used to spread
spam [8, 7] and misinformation [9, 10]. [15] estimates that the fake follower market produces $360 million
per year. Recently, several works have studied the existence of underground online markets where these
fraudulent actions can be purchased – [22, 14] explore underground markets providing fake content, reviews
and solutions to security mechanisms. [21] studies several fraud providers over time and describes trends in
pricing, account names and IP diversity. [19] compares growth rates of accounts with legitimate and fraud-
ulent followers. [1] observes the varying retention and reliability of various fraud providers. Comparatively,
our work is the first to identify major social graph differences between fraud types and across providers, and
propose novel entropy-based features for capturing these behaviors.
Fraud Detection: [2, 12] use profile features to detect spammers on Twitter. [18] passively analyzes ac-
counts with promiscuous following behavior and builds a classifier using profile and messaging features.
[4, 23] aim to find fake accounts in social networks via a generative stochastic model and a random-walk
based method respectively – both assume small cuts between fake and genuine nodes. [3, 5] use graph-
traversal based methods to find users with temporally synchronized actions on Facebook. [17, 11, 16]
propose spectral methods which identify dense or odd graph structures indicative of fraud.
3 Know Thy Enemy: Characterizing Link Fraud
In this section, we discuss some preliminaries about instrumentation, data collection and relevant metrics,
and next illustrate numerous insights about network connectivity and account attributes of link fraudsters.
3.1 Setup and Data Collection
We first discuss how we identified and purchased followers from target fraud service providers, and next
detail the scraping task, followed by preliminaries.
3.1.1 Purchasing Fake Followers
There are a number of different fraud service providers easily accessible and available on the web. We begin
by identifying these services so we can purchase fake followers from them. To identify these services, we
used Google search and queried using keywords such as “buy Twitter followers.” Combining the search
results, we obtained a list of websites which claim to provide these services.
From surveying the websites on this list, we notice there are several prevalent models of service – we
categorize these into two frameworks: premium and freemium. Premium services offer customers multiple
tiers of follower counts (1K, 5K, 10K, etc.) for various amounts of money and ask only for the customer’s
Twitter username and a form of payment. Freemium services offer both a paid option as in premium services,
but additionally offer a free option which does not ask the user for money, but instead requires the user to
provide their Twitter login details to the service. In return for these details, the services promise to direct a
small number of followers to the account.
We next setup a pool of honeypot accounts by repeating the Twitter account creation process a number
of times using monikers from online screenname generators. We found that to create a sizeable pool of
honeypots, we needed to distribute the account creation over several IPs in order to avoid phone verification
prompts. Upon setting up the pool of honeypots, we purchased basic follower packages from several pre-
mium and paid freemium services, avoiding rarely used ones with low Alexa rank. Summarily, we bought
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Table 1: Honeypot account summaries.
Service Type Cost Followersbought
Followers
delivered
Followers
remaining
fastfollowerz Premium $19 1000 1060 10591060 1059
intertwitter Premium $14 1000 1099 9771102 974
devumi Premium $19 1000 1360 13581354 1354
twitterboost Premium $12 1000 1361 13611350 1350
plusfollower Freemium £9.99 1000 1094 7481078 737
hitfollow Freemium £9.99 1000 926 623937 638
newfollow Freemium £9.99 1000 884 600883 589
bigfolo Freemium £9.99 1000 872 594865 577
1K followers from 8 different services (4 freemium, 4 premium) to 2 honeypot accounts per service. We
chose to purchase 2 honeypot accounts per service instead of only 1 in order to examine the overlap dynam-
ics of fake links to multiple customers. The final list of the services we used, service types, costs and their
follower counts are summarized Table 1. Honeypots were created on the same day, and follower purchases
were all done at the same time. Furthermore, the honeypots attracted no followers by themselves prior to
the purchases. As a result, we posit that all followers of the honeypots are fake.
3.1.2 Instrumentation Details
Reproducibility: Code available at https://goo.gl/qMBWim.
We use the REST API to scrape data relevant to our operation from Twitter. As the API heavily rate-
limits various data resource types, it is only feasible to extract a limited amount of information as an end-user.
Prior to purchasing fake followers, we start a number of Python scripts which poll the API and insert data
into a Postgres database:
Honeypot account details: Every hour, we collect public details for each honeypot Twitter account includ-
ing number of friends and followees, number of favorites, number of Tweets, language, etc.
Honeypot account follower IDs: Every 12 hours, we collect the list of follower IDs for each honeypot.
Since the honeypots were created with empty profiles, we can safely assume that all followers to these
accounts were fraudulent and purchased.
Honeypot account follower details: Every day, we extract public details for each of the accounts in the
honeypot follower list.
Honeypot account followers’ friends/followers IDs: Every day, we collect the list of friend and follower
IDs of the honeypot followers to examine their other connectivity.
Honeypot account followers’ friends/followers details: Every 3 days, we extract public details for each of
the friends and followers of the honeypot followers to gain more information about them.
Account details requests are limited to 15 requests per 15 minute window, and each request returns
details for up to 100 accounts. Similarly, ID list requests are limited to 180 requests per 15 minute window,
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and each request returns up to 5000 account IDs. Hence, it is relatively easy to scrape the first-order honeypot
account follower IDs and details without exceeding the rate limit, but collecting details for the second-order
followers is a bottleneck. Since the number of nodes to collect information for can explode substantially
even at the second-order, we limit collection to <100K friends and followers for each of the given follower of
the honeypot account. We determine periodicity values empirically using back-of-the-envelope calculations.
While this data could be collected slowly using a single Twitter API key, we speed up the process by using
multiple keys and cycling keys upon resource exhaustion.
3.1.3 Preliminaries
In the remainder of our work, we conduct analysis on two types of networks: the ego network and boomerang
network.
Ego network: An ego network (or egonet) traditionally consists of a central node called the ego, as well as
the neighboring nodes and the relationships (edges) between them. Egonets can essentially be considered as
a local graphical representation of a node within the context of the broader, global graph and depict how the
surrounding nodes are connected. For our purposes, we examine per-service egonets, where we consider the
union of the individual egonets of both honeypot accounts per service. Thus, in our case, each per-service
egonet is actually comprised by 2 egos (the honeypot accounts), the union of both honeypots’ neighboring
nodes (the purchased, fake followers) and the relationships between them. The per-service egonet repre-
sentation allows us to both individually study the per-honeypot egonets as well as any interactions between
them. That is, if the two honeypots for each service have distinct sets of neighboring nodes, then their
per-honeypot egonets will also be distinct. Conversely, if any nodes are neighbors of both honeypots, the as-
sociated per-honeypot egonets will be conjoined. Various levels of overlap suggest differences with regards
to how services reuse accounts to deliver fake links.
Boomerang network: Drawing conclusions from per-service egonet analysis can be deceiving in the sense
that while it does give insights into the internal relationships between the fake followers and honeypots,
it does not consider the external relationships formed by the fake followers. As such, it is unable to give
us a full perspective on the utilization of these fake followers. In order to gain the requisite perspective,
we conduct analysis of the proposed boomerang network. We define the per-service boomerang network
to be comprised of the per-service egonet in addition to the out-links of the follower nodes – the structure
is reminiscent of a boomerang, in that it is comprised of the nodes “1 step back and 1 step forward” with
respect to the honeypot account. Thus, the per-service boomerang network gives us an additional layer of
information on top of the per-service egonet: connections to the other accounts followed by the honeypot’s
fake followers.
We further use the density, bipartite density, transitivity and reciprocity metrics to summarize and de-
scribe network structure, and overlap coefficient and multiple systems estimation (MSE) to characterize
network overlap.
Density: We define density as
#edges
#nodes · (#nodes − 1)
Density represents the fraction of existing to possible total edges, with density 1 indicating a complete graph.
Bipartite density: We define bip. density between sets A and B as
#edges between A and B
(#nodes in A) · (#nodes in B)
Bipartite density captures the fraction of existing to possible edges between two sets of nodes, with bipartite
density 1 indicating a complete bipartite graph.
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Transitivity: We define transitivity as
3 · #triangles
#connected triples
Transitivity denotes the degree of triadic closure, with transitivity 1 indicating that all connected triples of
nodes are also triangles.
Reciprocity: We define reciprocity as
#bidirectional edges
#edges
Reciprocity conveys the relative frequency of bidirectional edges, with reciprocity 1 indicating that all edges
are bidirectional.
Overlap coefficient: We define overlap coef. between A and B as
|A ∩ B|
min(|A|, |B|)
Overlap coefficient indicates the proportion of members that overlap between sets, with overlap coefficient
1 indicating that A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A and 0 indicating A ∩ B = ∅.
Multiple systems estimation: We use MSE to estimate population size from two randomly sampled setsA
and B as |A| · |B|
|A ∩ B|
Intuitively, if A and B have low overlap, the total population size is much larger than if they have high
overlap.
Upon shifting our discussion to account attributes distributions, we use entropy as a means to capture
distributional skew.
Entropy: We define entropy for a distribution X with n outcomes (x1 . . . xn) as
−
n∑
i=1
P (xi) · log2 P (xi)
Entropy measures the unpredictability of a distribution in bits of information, with entropy of 0 bits indicat-
ing concentration of 100% probability on a single outcome, and entropy of log2 n bits indicating uniform
distribution of probability between n outcomes.
3.2 Network Observations
We first focus on studying the local network properties of fraudulent accounts. Targeting oddities in net-
work connectivity is a central theme in many link fraud detection approaches, as the mission constraints of
delivering fake links to customers necessarily affects graph structure. But what are these changes? In this
section, we leverage social network analysis tools to characterize effects of fraud on the surrounding net-
work structure, and show the similarities and differences between premium and freemium fraud. We detail
analyses on two types of induced subgraphs: the ego network and more expansive boomerang network.
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(a) fastfollowerz (b) intertwitter (c) devumi (d) twitterboost
(e) plusfollower (f) newfollow (g) hitfollow (h) bigfolo
Figure 2: Premium fraudsters (top) form overlapping stars whereas freemium ones (bottom) form
dense, near-cliques. Subplots show per-service egonets with honeypots in dark-red – darker color and
larger size indicates higher in-degree.
3.2.1 Ego Network Patterns
Figure 2 shows the per-service egonets for each of the 8 providers, with increased node size and darkness
corresponding to higher in-degree. The honeypots (egos) are the two large and dark orange colored nodes in
each subfigure. Cursory analysis reveals a notable difference in egonet network structure between freemium
and premium providers. We see that the premium egonets (first row) have a star/bipartite structure: each hon-
eypot node is the hub of a star, and the satellite nodes overlap and are disconnected. Conversely, freemium
egonets have denser, near-clique type structure which suggests denser connectivity between the neighboring
nodes.
The statistics for premium service egonets in Table 2 (top) further lend credence to the visual differences
we observe from Figure 2, giving us the following insight:
Insight 1 (Egonet Sparsity). Premium fake followers rarely follow each other, resulting in sparse egonet
structure. Freemium fake followers have dense egonet structure.
This is substantiated by the low density and node to edge ratios across premium providers. Of these,
fastfollowerz and intertwitter have an order of magnitude greater density than devumi and twitterboost.
This is substantiated by the 1:2 node to edge ratio in the former 2 providers as compared to the near 1:1 ratios
of the latter 2. fastfollowerz and intertwitter also have marginally higher transitivity values compared to
the 0 transitivity of devumi and twitterboost, indicating that the former 2 have few triangles between the
fake follower nodes whereas the latter 2 have none. We also observe no reciprocal links in these providers,
indicating only one-way relationships.
Conversely, the freemium statistics in Table 2 (bottom) support that freemium fake followers have dense
egonet structures. Freemium providers are an order of magnitude denser than the densest premium egonets
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Table 2: Egonet summary statistics.
Service # Nodes # Edges Density Transitivity Reciprocity
Pr
em
iu
m fastfollowerz 1,066 2,289 .002 .001 .000
intertwitter 1,051 2,003 .002 .00006 .000
devumi 2,681 2,712 .0003 .000 .000
twitterboost 2,680 2,711 .0004 .000 .000
Fr
ee
m
iu
m plusfollower 920 51,868 .061 .288 .411
newfollow 755 37,052 .065 .294 .408
hitfollow 782 41,879 .068 .305 .416
bigfolo 749 36,043 .064 .294 .413
– all 4 providers have 6-7% density. While not shown in interest of space, the per-honeypot egonets were
each found to have an even higher 11-14% density individually. The 1:50 node to edge ratios substantiate
this high density. We also notice that transitivity values are much higher for freemium providers, suggesting
that an unusually high 28-30% of wedges are also triangles. Given that density and transitivity are equal
in random graphs, the freemium egonets do not appear to be random, but are likely composed of dense
subregions which are themselves sparsely connected. The link structure reflects how freemium providers
trade follows between accounts (random partitions, biased selection, account similarity, etc.) Furthermore,
all 4 providers have similar, high reciprocity of 40-42% suggesting frequent “follow-back” behavior.
Rationale: The freemium services accumulates a pool of free accounts, and hence trading follows enables
each free user to gain some followers. As a result, such behavior creates a denser subgraph, but are also used
by providers to deliver the follower demands of paid customers and turn a profit. Comparatively, premium
providers are unable to use free users’ accounts and must create fake accounts.
These insights pose an interesting question: as we expect fraudsters to act in a manner that maximizes
profit, what motivates the differences in structure between freemium and premium providers? We propose
an answer: If we consider that each account has a budget of edges it can create without being suspended,
it seems that premium providers greatly underutilize accounts compared to freemium ones. This is because
for fraudsters, delivering more links while avoiding suspension is strictly better as it means that they can
either serve more customers or artificially inflate their own popularity.
3.2.2 Boomerang Network Patterns
Figure 3 shows 2 boomerang networks, one for bigfolo and twitterboost, each representative of a different
fraud strategy. Again, honeypot accounts are amongst the large, dark nodes with high in-degree, and the
lighter, smaller nodes are fake followers or their friends. Note that the layout clusters nodes based on similar
linkage, so groups of nodes visually close share connectivity properties. As with egonets, we again see
a stark contrast in the boomerang structure of these two providers. Figure 3a shows the dense internal
connectivity of bigfolo’s fake followers (as we saw in Figure 2h), in conjunction with the sparser and less
compact external connectivity to friends. Conversely, Figure 2d shows sparse internal connectivity between
twitterboost’s fake followers on the left, but dense near-bipartite external connectivity to the customers
(including honeypots) on the right.
Table 3 (top) gives summary statistics about premium boomerang networks, which substantiate the
following:
Insight 2 (Boomerang Density). Premium fake followers are frequently reused to follow customers, resulting
in dense external connectivity in the boomerang network. Freemium fake followers are less reused to follow
customers, and hence have sparse external connectivity.
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Table 3: Boomerang network summary statistics.
Service # Nodes # Edges Bip. Density
Pr
em
iu
m fastfollowerz 40,486 491,458 .012
intertwitter 176,921 2,383,251 .013
devumi 67,893 2,495,586 .014
twitterboost 68,297 2,474,759 .014
Fr
ee
m
iu
m plusfollower 646,901 1,352,253 .002
newfollow 616,824 1,221,574 .003
hitfollow 558,100 1,172,248 .003
bigfolo 574,823 1,157,672 .003
Interestingly, we see that the relative values of these statistics are inverted for the boomerang networks
from the egonets – unlike for egonets where the density metric was an order of magnitude higher for
freemium providers, the bipartite density in boomerang networks is instead an order of magnitude higher
for the premium providers.Note that the premium providers’ bipartite density indicates that nearly 1-2% (a
huge amount) of all possible edges between the fake followers and their combined set of friends exists. The
node to edge ratios are also much higher for premium providers – fastfollowerz and intertwitter are 1:14,
and devumi and twitterboost are roughly 1:37 compared to only 1:2 for the freemium providers.
The freemium boomerang network statistics in Table 3 (bottom) again establishes the second part of the
insight. This is further substantiated by the observation that freemium providers have an order of magnitude
lower bipartite density than premium ones. We also observe that freemium boomerang networks have higher
number of nodes than the premium counterpart. This is intuitive as freemium followers are otherwise gen-
uine accounts, they have an expansive set of true friends, whereas premium fake followers are all synthetic
accounts.
3.2.3 Network Overlap Patterns
In our analysis thus far, we noticed that various providers have different levels of evident overlap in the fake
followers they deliver between their 2 honeypots. How extensive is this overlap? Do these providers reuse
accounts in the same ways? Furthermore, is there any overlap between the followers across providers? Here,
we shed light on these questions.
Intra-Network Patterns First, we study intra-network overlap, describing overlap between the fake fol-
lower nodes within each service. Table 4 shows the overlap coefficients between the honeypot followers for
each service. Assuming the followers for each honeypot are randomly sampled from the service’s account
pool, we additionally compute the estimated total number of fake accounts currently in the fraud provider’s
hands using MSE.
The various degrees of overlap and commensurate estimates of pool size suggest the following insight:
Insight 3 (Varying Delivery Structure). Service providers have varying methods for account reuse in efforts
to to distribute suspicion across their account pools.
We observe that the freemium providers tend to have a high, 0.8 overlap which results in an estimated
pool size slightly larger than either of the two sets of honeypot followers. However, the premium providers
have an interesting split which reveals that fastfollowerz and intertwitter have very high, near 1.0 overlap,
resulting in the pool size being roughly equal to each set of followers. This indicates that the pool is reused
9
(a) bigfolo (fre.) (b) twitterboost (pre.)
Figure 3: Freemium followers have dense internal and sparse external connectivity (top), and vice
versa for premium followers (bottom). Subplots show boomerang networks, with darker node color and
larger size indicating higher in-degree.
Table 4: Fraud providers have varying account reuse habits.
Service # Nodes Overlap Est. Pool # Nodes
Pr
em
iu
m fastfollowerz 1,064 .996 1,064
intertwitter 1,049 .953 1,051
devumi 2,679 .024 55,719
twitterboost 26,78 .024 55,677
Fr
ee
m
iu
m plusfollower 918 .815 954
newfollow 753 .765 798
hitfollow 780 .802 814
bigfolo 747 .774 791
almost exactly for multiple customers. Conversely, devumi and twitterboost have near 0 overlap. As a
result, we estimate that the pool size is quite large, containing over 55K total fake accounts.
While we cannot be certain without further investigation, these providers likely have different means
of selecting and shifting the pool of active fake followers. For example, the pools used in fastfollowerz
and intertwitter may cycle between a number of different “sub-pools” based on time, customer account
features, or random choice. Conversely, the evidently much larger estimated pool size for devumi and
twitterboost suggests that they may each have a single, large fixed pool of usable accounts from which
followers are sampled regardless of other factors.
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Table 5: Fraud providers share follower accounts.
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Pr
em
iu
m fastfollowerz 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
intertwitter 0 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
devumi 0 0 1.0 .07 0 0 0 0
twitterboost 0 0 .07 1.0 0 0 0 0
Fr
ee
m
iu
m plusfollower 0 0 0 0 1.0 .65 .69 .64
newfollow 0 0 0 0 .65 1.0 .64 .63
hitfollow 0 0 0 0 .69 .64 1.0 .63
bigfolo 0 0 0 0 .64 .64 .63 1.0
Inter-Network Patterns Thus far, we have established that providers reuse multiple follower accounts
across customers in order to turn a better profit. But how far does this reuse go? Are any accounts responsible
for delivering fake links to customers from different providers? To answer these questions, we study the
pairwise inter-network overlap of followers between providers.
Table 5 shows an 8 × 8 matrix with the pairwise overlap coefficients. Given the number of nonzero
entries, we draw the following surprising insight:
Insight 4 (Collusion). Service providers seem to collaborate with and draw from each other to commit
fraudulent actions.
We notice that there is substantial overlap within the freemium and premium providers. While fastfol-
lowerz and intertwitter share no accounts with the other premium providers, devumi and twitterboost
have a .07 overlap. Comparatively, all 4 freemium providers have a large 0.6-0.7 overlap, indicating that
most of their fake accounts are the same. Furthermore, the set of followers for freemium and premium
providers have 0 overlap, substantiating that followers in freemium providers are otherwise real accounts
whereas those in premium providers are synthetic.
Nonzero overlap between providers is an interesting finding – it is indicative of either a willingness to
share follower accounts between fraud providers, or commonality in leaked or hijacked accounts. Upon
further inspection, we notice a number of suggestive findings:
• Overlapping providers shared domain WHOIS protectors.
• Overlapping premium providers use the same Yoast SEO plugin and stylesheets.
• All freemium providers have two-column sites, advertised up to 30K followers, and priced from £9.99.
• All fremium providers contained the line: “[service] is Not Affiliated With OR Endorsed By Twit-
ter.com.”
3.3 Attribute Observations
In this section, we study the similarities and differences in account attributes of fake followers. Table 6
shows per-service, per-attribute entropy in bits for a variety of user attributes. The account attributes include
creation year, default profile and profile image booleans, favorites count, followers count, friends count, lists
count, statuses count, geolocation enabled boolean, language identifier, protected statuses boolean, UTC
timezone, and a Twitter verification boolean which corresponds to high-profile, “famous” accounts. These
attributes have varying outcome spaces. Creation date has 11 possible years (2006-2016), since Twitter was
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Table 6: Per-service entropy (in bits) over account attribute distributions.
Service Created (year) Def. Prof. Def. Prof. Image # Favorites # Followers # Friends # Lists # Statuses Geolocation Lang. Protected UTC Verified
Pr
em
iu
m fastfollowerz 1.37 .63 .01 3.65 2.73 2.73 2.99 3.8 .00 .06 .00 1.04 .00
intertwitter 2.99 .82 .94 4.04 3.54 2.63 2.53 4.31 .67 2.55 .56 1.97 .18
devumi 1.13 .97 .02 1.05 1.54 1.17 2.49 1.18 .00 .00 .00 1.42 .00
twitterboost 1.13 .97 .03 1.05 1.56 1.16 2.51 1.15 .00 .00 .00 1.41 .00
Fr
ee
m
iu
m plusfollower 1.82 .93 .73 4.18 3.76 3.38 2.73 4.40 .54 2.04 .30 1.70 .00
newfollow 1.68 .90 .75 4.20 3.70 3.32 2.64 4.37 .55 1.99 .28 1.62 .00
hitfollow 1.78 .93 .73 4.14 3.76 3.32 2.72 4.37 .52 2.01 .30 1.70 .00
bigfolo 1.88 .92 .75 4.20 3.74 3.34 2.72 4.40 .56 2.05 .32 1.71 .00
Max Entropy: 3.46 1.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 1.00 5.13 1.00 5.29 1.00
founded in 2006. Booleans have 2 possible outcomes (T,F). We encountered 35 different language identifiers
and 39 UTC timezone settings. For count features, we logarithmically discretized the space into 32 bins
from 1 to 1M to capture the wide range of activity levels. For each service, we aggregate attribute values
and compute the entropy over the outcomes. The table shows the actual sample entropy in addition to the
maximum possible (uniform) entropy. As previously mentioned, lower entropy indicates high synchronicity
between followers. Note that a difference in entropy of 1 bit corresponds to twice the predictability.
The most striking insight from Table 6 is as follows:
Insight 5 (Entropy Gap). Premium service providers deliver followers with low entropy, high regularity
attributes, whereas freemium service providers have more attribute disparity.
We notice that the premium providers have substantially lower entropy values in many attributes versus
freemium providers, and even near 0 entropy in other attributes like geolocation. We elaborate on the specific
differences next.
3.3.1 Account Creation
devumi, twitterboost and fastfollowerz have very low creation year entropy compared to freemium
providers. While both freemium and premium accounts tend to be created more recently (perhaps because
of higher suspension rate in older accounts), premium providers have a heavy bias towards recently created
accounts (>2014).
3.3.2 Profile Defaults
fastfollowerz has a much lower entropy than other providers in terms of default profile – we found that
>84% of these accounts did not have a default profile, whereas default profiles are actually more common
than not in freemium accounts. Surprisingly, fastfollowerz, devumi and twitterboost also have near
0 entropy for profile image compared to the much higher entropy for freemium providers. We find that
premium followers almost always set a custom image, suggesting that the information was fabricated or
stolen from real users. Conversely, default profile images are common for freemium service accounts – this
is intuitive, most real users do not fully customize their profiles.
3.3.3 Action Counts
devumi and twitterboost have much lower entropy for action counts (favorites, followers, friends, lists
and statuses) compared to freemium providers. fastfollowerz also exhibits lower entropy. As Figure 1d
shows, there is even more variation between premium providers. Figure 1d shows that intertwitter (P1
“smart”) follower counts are disparate and closer to genuine users’ entropy, unlike other premium fraud-
sters (P2 “naïve”) who behave robotically. Comparatively, freemium followers have lower follower count
entropy compared to genuine ones, which is intuitive as while the freemium follows are real accounts, their
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follower counts are not independent from each other due to the follows traded between themselves. Figure
4 shows the rank-frequency plots for follower counts for various follower types. The plots substantiate our
observations on entropy, and also show that different user types exhibit differences with regards to power-
law fit, which is expected for skewed distributions on social networks. While entropy values in this paper
are computed empirically using the samples from Table 2, accounts on real networks have varying follower
counts, leading to different entropy estimates even when drawn from the same distribution. Fortunately,
we can intimately relate sample size and entropy of a power-law distribution in a closed form using the
Euler-Maclaurin formula as below:
Lemma 1 (Power-Law Entropy). The entropyH of a size |V | sample from a PL distribution P (r) = C ·r−a
is given by:
H ≈ −C · log2(C) · (|V |
1−α − 1)
1− α +
α · C · (−|V |1−α · ((α− 1) · ln(|V |) + 1) + 1)
(α− 1)2 · ln(2)
Proof.
H = −
|V |∑
r=1
Cr−α · log2C · r−α
≈ −
∫ V
1
C · r−α · log2Cdr + α · C
∫ V
1
r−α · log2 rdr
≈ −C · log2C · r
1−α
1− α
∣∣∣V
1
+ α · C
(−r1−α ((α− 1) · ln(r) + 1)
(α− 1)2 · ln(2)
∣∣∣V
1
)
≈ −C · log2(C) · (|V |
1−α − 1)
1− α +
α · C · (−|V |1−α · ((α− 1) · ln(|V |) + 1) + 1)
(α− 1)2
where C = 1/H|V |,α (inverse of the V th harmonic number of order α).
This estimate enables us to gauge how close varying-sized samples are to the original power-law. This
is especially useful for practitioners aiming to gauge what the entropy of an account’s followers’ attributes
theoretically should be according to the number of followers assuming a given power-law fit, versus the
empirical estimate. If these are not close, one can deduce that the account’s followers do not obey the
expected power-law fit and therefore may be suspicious. This procedure is computationally more efficient
and likely more accurate than fitting a separate power-law for each of the attributes across followers of each
account.
We noticed similar patterns in entropy for status and favorite counts as well. The lower entropy of action
counts characteristic of premium providers stems from the variety of options premium providers have for
Twitter engagement – in addition to fake followers, the premium providers also offer fake retweets and
favorites services. Thus, premium providers are incentivized to reuse accounts for multiple types of fraud,
and when done naïvely result in high synchrony in “serviceable” attributes.
3.3.4 User Settings
fastfollowerz, devumi and twitterboost all have near 0 geolocation, language, and tweet protection en-
tropy. Of these, all devumi and twitterboost accounts use the US English language setting, have geoloca-
tion disabled and do not protect tweets. fastfollowerz has a slightly higher language entropy of .06, but we
found that all fastfollowerz accounts were either using US or GB English, suggesting a heavy premium bias
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(a) Gen. follow count (b) Fre. follow count
(c) P1 (“smart”) follow count (d) P2 (“naïve”) follow count
Figure 4: Rank-frequency plots reveal different patterns in follower counts of various follower types.
Note that genuine follower counts in (a) reflect traditional power-law behavior with a common exponent
(∼ 1.2) and are linear in log-log scale. Freemium counts in (b) fit similarly, despite with a slightly lower
exponent (∼ 1.15). Comparatively, “smart” premium counts in (c) fit a power law but with much higher
exponents (∼ 1.66). Interestingly, we find that “naïve” premium followers do fit a power law, but have
unnaturally low exponents (∼ .148) due to their low entropy and highly concentrated, robotic behavior.
for English accounts. We also found that premium followers almost entirely have USA timezones. “Smart”
intertwitter followers’ high language entropy from Figure 1d suggests an aim to better camouflage user
attributes compard to the “naïve” providers. Given that intertwitter also has some verified accounts, we
hypothesize that the accounts may be hijacked ones. This is in contrast with freemium providers, which
have much higher frequency of enabled geolocation, variance in language and protected tweets. Figure 1d
also shows that freemium followers tend to appear similar to genuine ones as they are otherwise real user
accounts. However, we find that freemium followers have higher language entropy than genuine ones, as
freemium followers are spread over many languages whereas genuine followers tend to disproportionately
speak their followee’s language (i.e. if a user speaks Spanish, most of his followers speak Spanish).
Furthermore, all 4 freemium providers and twitterboost/devumi have extremely similar attribute en-
tropy over their fake followers respectively, further substantiating Insight 4.
In addition to the attributes reported in Table 6, we also studied the 160-character user description field.
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(a) Premium (b) Freemium
Figure 5: Freemium followers have social media (Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat) focused descriptions
(right), whereas premium followers have wordy descriptions (left).
The description field essentially contains the high-level summary of what the user aims to appear as to other
Twitter users, and is thus interesting to analyze. We ask: what, if any, are the differences between freemium
and premium follower descriptions?
Figure 5 shows two wordclouds, aggregated over description text across all premium and freemium
followers respectively. Font size corresponds to relative frequency in the text. For clarity, we remove
common stopwords. We arrive at the following insight:
Insight 6 (Clout vs. About). Freemium followers tend to have descriptions focusing on social media clout,
whereas premium followers tend to talk about themselves.
Figure 5a (premium), has words like “musician,” “lover,” “writer” and “sports”, corresponding to de-
scriptive personal details – these are likely copied from genuine users. Conversely, Figure 5b (freemium)
has terms like “snapchat,” “youtube,” and “instagram”, as these users try to increase clout by advertising
their other, real social media pages, i.e., “follow me on snapchat.”
4 Assessing Discriminative Power of Entropy Features
Thus far, we have highlighted a number of distributional differences between fraudulent and genuine users.
Can we leverage these differences to discriminate user behaviors? In this section, we evaluate a number of
attribute features on their discriminative power in a supervised setting.
We classified the engineered entropy features from Table 6 into the following groups based on feature
type:
• Connection: # Followers, # Friends
• Activity: # Statuses, # Lists, # Favorites
• Profile: Default Profile (and Image), Verified, Created
• Geography: Language, UTC
• All: the union of all above features
Note that while we nominally refer to these features as above, they refer to the entropy of the feature
over account followers, rather than raw values of the account itself.
We evaluate these features using binary classification (genuine vs. fraudulent) as is traditionally done in
practice. We use a Support Vector Machine (SVM) with radial basis function (RBF) kernel and 10-fold cross
validation as the classifier of choice, but any out-of-box classification method could be used. Our carefully
assembled ground-truth dataset consists of 307 fraudulent users and 200 genuine users, whose features
are computed over their followers. The fraudulent accounts are a combination of premium and freemium
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Figure 6: Leveraging all features together gives the best detection performance.
honeypots as well as accounts whose profiles have been listed on freemium providers’ websites as users of
the service. We define our fraudulent set over this multitude of account types with various properties in order
to demonstrate generality. The genuine accounts belong to well-known academics in machine learning and
data mining. We avoid using randomly sampled Twitter users, as previous works have shown a non-trivial
amount of fake accounts on Twitter which may excessively corrupt our ground-truth genuine set. In practice,
getting additional ground-truth labels is a very costly endeavor and requires careful manual inspection for
each individual case.
Figure 6 shows the relative performance of our feature groups in terms of overall precision and recall.
We notice that Connection features perform comparatively poorly, Profile and Activity features perform
better, Geography performs even better, and the combination All performs near-ideal with .98 precision and
.95 recall (much higher recall than supervised approaches which use raw account features for Twitter spam
classification [13]). Thus, we conclude that our proposed entropy features are highly reliable in discerning
genuine from fraudulent users. The added benefit of using the entropy-based features is that it is much
harder to control for from the fraudster’s perspective – this is because while the fraudster has significant
control over his own account’s properties, he has limited ability to influence who follows him.
5 Discussion
The analysis in this work has a number of important implications on fraud detection in practice. We detail
these below.
Multimodal Detection: Using individual signatures to find one type of fraud tends to be at the expense of
finding other types. For example, clique detection primarily focuses on freemium fraud, whereas bipartite
core detection focuses on premium fraud. Using complementary methods is a promising strategy.
Importance of Time: Varying account reuse policies makes temporal granularity an important considera-
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tion in graph-based fraud detection. While analysis on a low granularity graph can reveal dense fraudulent
structure in frequent reuse regimes, it may never do so for low reuse regimes. Higher granularity can be
useful in these cases.
Deceptive Account Attributes: Using individual account attributes to label fraudsters is of limited use.
Our work suggests that most freemium fraudsters are actually real users with real profile attributes – they
may be resistant to such detection schemes. Conversely, leveraging an account’s follower’s attributes shows
promise in bridging this gap.
Total vs. Partial Fraud: Different types of fraud may call for different penalties. While the implication
“has one fake link → has all fake links” seems true for premium fraudsters, it is not for freemium ones.
Removing fake links vs. suspending fake accounts is a promising way to penalize such fraudsters and
minimize false positives.
The need for multimodal anti-fraud mechanisms suggests a shift in the detection paradigm from drawing
a two-class boundary between genuine and “one-hat-fits-all” fraudulent users, to a more complex multiclass
boundary between genuine, premium fraudulent, freemium fraudulent, and other fraud types which may be
discovered in the future.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we aimed to study the nature of modern link fraud regimes. To this end, we setup honeypot
accounts on Twitter, purchased fake followers for them from a variety of fraud-provoding services, and
carefully instrumented a data scraping process to capture their behaviors. Specifically, we studied the local
network connectivity of fake followers via the egonet and proposed boomerang networks, as well as attribute
distributions over profile features and account actions. Our analyses showed that there are multiple types
of link fraud (we discover at least two: freemium and premium) with varying behaviors regarding internal
and external network connectivity, disparity in attribute homogeneity across followers, and differences in
descriptive word-usage in Twitter bios. Furthermore, we found fascinating evidence that service providers
have varying types of account-reuse policies and seem to collude with each other on a number of fronts.
Furthermore, we proposed the use of first-order entropy features taken across account followers’ attributes
to discern fraudulent from genuine accounts, and showed that these features were able to attain near-perfect
F1 score on our ground-truth dataset. Holistically, our work offers several implications for practical fraud
detection including multimodality of fraud behaviors, the importance of temporally sensitive algorithms,
usefulness of first-order versus zeroth-order features, and disadvantages of account-based versus link-based
fraud targeting.
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